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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we assess the effects of Central Bank Funding
(C.B.F.) on commercial bank lending behaviour by using weekly
Turkish data from 7 January 2011 to 5 June 2015. To be specific,
using the Nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag Error
Correction Model, we assess the effects of C.B.F. provided daily by
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey through Open Market
Operations to financial markets. Our empirical evidence reveals
that for all types of lending, an increase in C.B.F. (which has a
higher cost for commercial banks relative to alternatives) forces
commercial banks to borrow from higher-cost channels, i.e., we
find that increasing C.B.F. discourages commercial bank lending.
We also find that decreases in C.B.F. that proxy what commercial
banks can borrow more cheaply from alternative sources increase
commercial bank lending. However, increasing C.B.F. is more effect-
ive than decreasing C.B.F. for Total Bank Loans, Total Credit Cards
and Automobile Loans, and decreasing C.B.F. is more effective in
the short run for Consumption Loans, Housing Loans and
Commercial Loans: short-run asymmetry. Therefore, we can report
only limited support for long-run asymmetry, and consequently,
claim that there is magnitude (an increase versus decrease in C.B.F.)
and category asymmetry (across different lending categories).
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1. Introduction
After the 2008 financial crises, central banks faced challenges in stabilising their
economies in addition to addressing price stability and excessive capital flows. Thus,
central banks, including the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (C.B.R.T.), devel-
oped and used new monetary policy tools (in addition to traditional tools such as
short-term interest rate) to address these issues, such as multiple short-term interest
rates, buying and selling foreign currency, macroprudential tools and the Reserve
Option Mechanism (R.O.M.; see Varlik and Berument, 2016 and 2017 for a review of
relevant tools)1.
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With its new financial architecture, the C.B.R.T. provides various types of liquidity
to financial markets through various types of costs and restrictions (i.e., tools). One
such tool is Central Bank Funding (C.B.F.), and the logic behind it is as follows: as
the C.B.R.T. cuts types of liquidity with lower costs to financial markets and thus
forces market participants to borrow at a higher cost within the limits of commercial
banks’ positions at the central bank, the funding costs of commercial banks will
increase and thus banks will alter their lending behaviour. Therefore, an increase in
C.B.F. associated with a higher cost for commercial banks results in a decrease in
commercial bank lending. In other words, the C.B.R.T. may increase C.B.F. to tighten
monetary policy (see C.B.R.T., 2015, pp. 2–3), and this paper assesses how changes in
C.B.F. affect various types of commercial bank lending and whether an increase ver-
sus decrease in C.B.F. affects commercial bank lending differently.
Post-2008, central banks have been using multiple tools to set up their monetary
policies. Sometimes, however, they use policy tools in a ‘wrong way’ (in Brainard’s
(1967) sense), such that an adverse effect of one policy tool is decreased by using
another policy tool that moves in the opposite direction.2 This paper assesses the
effect of one policy tool on commercial bank lending (a central bank transmission
channel on economic performance) rather than the effect on total economic perform-
ance. There are various reasons for this approach. First, the C.B.R.T. argues that dif-
ferent monetary policy tools affect different variables to a different degree. For
example, Kara3 (2015a) argues that a lower band of interest rate is important for
international capital inflows, and that the cost of funding to all commercial banks is
important for banks’ deposit interest rates. Er and Guney (2016) and Guler et al.
(2014) argue that C.B.F. affects the banking sector’s credit cost and its credit quantity
dynamics. Thus, because the C.B.R.T. might be using C.B.F. in a ‘wrong way’, we dir-
ectly look at the effects of C.B.F. on the bank’s intended intermediate targets rather
than at the effect of C.B.F. on economic performance. Second, commercial banks
obtain various short- and long-term funding from various sources. Increasing the lat-
ter might be a desired aim, but the former is more dominant in financing banking
sector loans. Therefore, determining the cost composition of these funds is essential
(Deans and Stewart, 2012; Fabbro and Hack, 2011; Wong, 2012; Beau et al., 2014).
Commercial banks also use short- and long-term funds for their credits. Different
credits have different characteristics: maturity, likelihood or expectations of refinanc-
ing, liquidity and interest rate elasticities. Note that different types of lending will be
affected differently as the stance of monetary policy changes. Commercial banks will
choose less-risky projects and begin to exhibit flight-to-quality behaviour, as men-
tioned by Lang and Nakamura (1995) and Gambacorta and Rossi (2010). Commercial
credits are given only to those with more solid collateral, and the term structure of
the funding cost is usually longer. Therefore, with a tighter monetary policy stance,
banking sector credits, especially consumer credits, are affected more than commer-
cial loans are because short-term sources are deviated to short-term credits. Cash-
restricted consumers are also prone to purchase on credit, despite its cost, because
they usually do not like to postpone their wants and needs (see Wickens, 2012,
p. 202).
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Third, it is important to understand how different types of lending are affected by
monetary policy tools because the C.B.R.T. argues that not all types of lending have
the same effect on economic performance. For example, the C.B.R.T. (2015, p. 10)
notes that commercial lending from commercial banks has a smaller effect on the
current account than consumer credit lending does. Aliogullari, Baskaya, Bulut and
Kilinc (2015), also from the C.B.R.T., support the increasing effect of consumer cred-
its on the current account but do not find a significant effect for commercial loans.
The C.B.R.T. argues that it uses the funding mechanism to affect these credits as well
(see, for example, C.B.R.T., 2014).
As liquidity decreases, commercial banks may need to wait for credit maturity to
recall their credits. Further, refinancing credits or increasing interest rates may not be
possible, therefore it is not easy for commercial banks to call in these credits.4
However, because the C.B.R.T. provides liquidity, it is easier for commercial banks to
open new credit lines. Thus, there might be an asymmetry for the different effects of
liquidity on different types of credits. The potential motives for this asymmetry have
been studied within the literature, and Gambacorta and Rossi (2010) provide a good
review of this issue. One channel the above authors suggest is capital regulation,
under which it is necessary for commercial banks to keep the ratio between lending
and bank capital at a certain minimum level. A looser monetary policy stance (which
may also be associated with lower C.B.F.) may further limit commercial banks from
extending credits, but a similar effect may not be observed under a tighter monetary
stance. Alternatively, Friedman et al. (1993) note the differential cost effect of internal
and external funds; a tighter monetary policy is associated with more internal funds
(less demand on commercial bank lending) but a looser monetary policy stance may
encourage more external financing for corporates, and thus higher lending.
The C.B.R.T. provides liquidity to markets in various channels, each of which has
a different cost and availability. One such channel is C.B.F., and the cost of using this
channel is high: as the C.B.R.T. tightens market liquidity through channels with a
lower cost, commercial banks must borrow higher-cost funding (i.e., C.B.F.), which
we take as an indicator of tighter monetary policy. Thus, higher usage of C.B.F.
means a tighter monetary policy stance.
Total Banks (Commercial banks (34) þ Development and Investment Banks (13)
þ Participation Banks (5)) constitute 81% of the financial system in Turkey as of the
year 2016. The remaining are: Portfolio management companies (4%),
Unemployment insurance fund (4%), Insurance companies (3%), Real estate invest-
ment trusts (2%), Pension investment funds (2%), Individual pension funds (2%),
Financial leasing companies (1%), Factoring companies (1%), Financial companies
(1%), Intermediary institutions (1%), and negligibly, each of Reinsurance companies,
Venture capital funds, and Securities investment trusts (see The Banks Association of
Turkey, 2017, pp. 15–16 for details of the banking structure in Turkey). Given the
above information, banks are one of the basic and most important financial institu-
tions in Turkey (and elsewhere).
In Turkey, other types of banks (such as participation banks) follow and consider
a non-interest-rate policy of Islamic rules. For example, they do not pay interest on
deposits but offer profit shares in the bank. Their share and role in the country’s
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banking system is smaller; as of 2016, there are only five participation banks in
Turkey, and these have a 5% share in total banking sector assets (commercial banks
have a 90% share) (The Banks Association of Turkey, 2017, p.17). Development and
investment banks also exist, which do not accept deposits from customers and mostly
lend money to government-sponsored projects that have virtually no default risk,
thus the interest rates charged are not representative of the market.
In other words, commercial banks constitute the biggest and most important com-
ponent of Turkey’s financial sector. Commercial banks can extend their credit lines
in foreign currency only to companies with revenue in foreign currency, such as
export firms. Moreover, due to a tax code that does not account for volatile and high
inflation, loan transactions are conducted mostly in fixed-rate domestic currency
rather than inflation index contracts or foreign currency contracts. Due to relatively
thin volatile government bond markets, loan contracts indexed to government secur-
ities are also non-existent. Thus, loans extended by commercial banks constitute the
biggest loan share of Turkey’s banking system.
We analysed the effects of increases versus decreases in C.B.F. on different types of
lending and differentiated banking sector credits into Credit Cards, Automobile
Loans, Consumption Loans, Housing Loans and Commercial Loans to see whether
there was any heterogeneity among the responses. For Turkey, Guler et al. (2014)
study the effect of C.B.F. on credits5 and argue that increasing C.B.F. financed by
short-term borrowing will increase the maturity mismatch of bank balance sheets,
which in turn will increase interest rate risk and affect credits and their compositions.
We extend the Guler et al. (2014) exercise and analyse the effects of C.B.F. on bank-
ing sector credits by using the Nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag model
(N.A.R.D.L.), which also allows for the asymmetric response of loans to changes in
C.B.F. Our model also assesses this effect for short- and long-term asymmetry.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways: (i) Using N.A.R.D.L., we
provide empirical evidence on the effect of C.B.F. on various types of commercial
bank lending. (ii) We allow asymmetry to show that increases and decreases in C.B.F.
affect lending differently. (iii) Our methodology allows us to assess long- versus
short-run asymmetry. (iv) Our methodology also allows us to compare the effects of
C.B.F. on various types of lending.
We assess the effectiveness of C.B.F. in Turkey on commercial bank lending. The
empirical evidence provided here reveals that for all types of lending, an increase in
C.B.F. decreases commercial bank lending, and shows that decreases in C.B.F.
increase commercial bank lending. However, increasing C.B.F. is more effective than
decreasing it for Total Bank Loans, Total Credit Cards and Automobile Loans, and
decreasing C.B.F. is more effective for Consumption Loans, Housing Loans and
Commercial Loans in the short-run: short-run asymmetry. The supporting evidence
on the long-run asymmetry is limited.
The next section (Section 2) discusses the development of Turkey’s monetary pol-
icy since the 2000s. Section 3 introduces the data and methodology. Section 4 pro-
vides the empirical evidence concerning the estimates of the N.A.R.D.L.-Error
Correction Model (E.C.M.). Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 elaborates
on further research and concludes the paper.
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2. Development of Turkey’s monetary policy
With high and volatile foreign capital inflows mostly stemming from portfolio invest-
ment occurring in the 2000s, the C.B.R.T. implemented a more flexible tool than short-
term interest rates to affect economic performance. The C.B.R.T. began an inflation-tar-
geting regime in 2006, and the new tool was developed around an interest rate rather
than an exchange rate (see, for instance, Basci,6 Ozel and Sarikaya, 2007 and Basci and
Kara, 2011). The C.B.R.T. also designed a new set of policy tools through the banking
sector’s credit channel (see C.B.R.T., 2015 and 2014).7 The C.B.R.T. focused on this
channel because the banking sector is the single most important conduit through which
to implement monetary policy, and commercial banks (C.B.s) are the most dominant
players in the banking sector for Turkey. As of 2011, 90.44% of total banking sector
domestic loans were from C.B.s, whereas only 3.60% and 5.95% were from investment
and development banks and participation banks, respectively.89
The C.B.R.T. provides daily liquidity to financial markets in various forms and
through various channels, such as Open Market Operations (O.M.O.) with different
maturities10 (overnight, over-week and over-month), discount windows and additions
to short-term interest rates through a set of strict limits on their usage and costs. The
weighted average cost of the C.B.R.T.’s lending at different frequencies is higher than
the lower bound of the corridor, and more important, higher than the C.B.R.T.’s offi-
cial monetary policy tool the over-week interest rate. The over-week rate fluctuates
between the lower and upper bands, as shown in Figure 1a. There is a limit for over-
week borrowing but clients can engage in unlimited overnight borrowing using
Repurchase Agreements (repo) transactions as long as C.B.s provide pre-defined
qualified government bonds in exchange. Thus, as the C.B.R.T. makes commercial
banks borrow at overnight rates, this higher borrowing cost means a tighter liquidity
condition (C.B.R.T., 2015, pp. 2-3).
Figure 1a. Interest rate behaviour in Turkey from 7 January 2011 to 10 June 2015. Source:
C.B.R.T.’s interactive graphing tool. Upper limit of the shaded corridor: O/N lending interest rate;
Lower part of the shaded area: O/N borrowing interest rate; Purple: One-week repo rate; Blue:
B.I.S.T. overnight repo rates (five-day moving average); Red: C.B.R.T. average fund rate (five-day
moving average).
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Although commercial bank funding from the C.B.R.T. is small, it is important in
these banks’ decision-making processes. At the end of our sample period, the ratio of
C.B.F. to Total TL-denominated Commercial and Retail Loans is 9% (Figure 1b). A
higher funding cost affects commercial bank lending preferences.11 As the cost of bor-
rowing from the C.B.R.T. increases, commercial banks will need to pass on that
increase to borrowers.12 Usually, the C.B.R.T. aims for banks to lend or borrow from
each other within a pre-defined interest rate corridor; it is not profitable for commer-
cial banks to lend or borrow from the C.B.R.T. using a high lending interest rate and
a low borrowing rate. However, the C.B.R.T. is the net funder for financial markets
(see Figure 1a), and thus a bank’s net liquidity position affects its lending level on the
asset side of the balance sheet due to the C.B.R.T.’s actions, particularly with C.B.F.
3. Data and methodology
We gathered weekly data from the C.B.R.T.’s E.D.D.S. from 7 January 2011 to 5 June
2015; details are provided in Table 1. All series are deflated (normalised) with a sixth
lag of Total Bank Loans times 100 to avoid simultaneity.13 Total Bank Loans consists
of the sum of the total loans of C.B.s, investment and development banks,14 participa-
tion banks and finance companies. Following Enders (2010, p. 303) and the referen-
ces cited therein, we did not difference the data, although there is a case of unit root.
The unit root tests and a set of robustness analyses are not reported here but are
available from the authors upon request.
To capture the asymmetric effect of C.B.F. on credit, we employ Shin et al.’s
(2014) N.A.R.D.L. method. This approach allows us to assess the short- and long-run
responses of credit-to-C.B.F. increases versus decreases. The method also allows us to
gather inferences regardless of the variables’ integration orders. The method decom-
poses C.B.F. into its positive and negative partial sums as:
Figure 1b. Ratio of C.B.F. to commercial and retail loans from January 2011 to June 2015 (%).
Source: C.B.R.T., E.D.D.S. Note: The y axis is the percentage ratio of C.B.F. to loans.
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CBFþ ¼
Xt
i¼1
DCBFþi ¼
Xt
i¼1
Max DCBFi; 0ð Þ (1)
and
CBF ¼
Xt
i¼1
DCBFi ¼
Xt
i¼1
Min DCBFi; 0ð Þ: (2)
The asymmetric long-run relationship without a constant term can be represented as
CRt ¼ bþCBFþt þ bCBFt þ ut;
where Credits (CRt) and CBF are scalar I(1) variables. Granger and Yoon (2002)
extend the model, where cointegration may exist for their positive and negative
components. Schorderet (2003) generates the above specification for asymmetric coin-
tegration such that there may be a stationary variable zt, which may be written as:
zt ¼ bþ0 CRþt þ b0 CRt þ bþ1 CBFþt þ b1 CBFt ; (3)
where CRt and CBFt are asymptotically cointegrated. If b
þ
0 ¼ b0 and bþ1 ¼ b1 , then
the system reduces to (symmetric) cointegration. Following Shin et al. (2014), we
extend the Linear E.C.M. to a general N.A.R.D.L.-E.C.M. as follows:
Table 1. Details of the data.
Variables Explanation Codes
Central Bank Funding (CBF) Weekly average of the daily Funding
Needs data, and the exact dates
matched with the lending data
C.B.R.T. Net Funding Data
Total Bank Loans Commercial Bank Loansþ Investment
and Development Bank
Loansþ Participation Bank
Loansþ Finance Companies’ Loans
TP.BFTUKKRE.LOO1:
Iþ TP.BFTUKKRE.L192:
IIþ TP.BFTUKKRE.L233:
IIIþ TP.BFTUKKRE.L290: IV
Total Credit Cards Public Deposit Money Bank Credit
Cardsþ Private Deposit Money
Bank Credit Cardsþ Foreign
Deposit Money Bank Credit Cards
TF.BF.TUKKRE.L064:I.I.2.a.TRY
Automobile Loans Deposit Money Bank Automobile
Loansþ Participation Bank
Automobile Loans
TP.BFTUKKRE.L007:I.C.2 þ
TP.BFTUKRE.L237.III.A.2
Consumption Loans Public Deposit Money Bank
Consumption Loansþ Private
Deposit Money Bank Consumption
Loansþ Foreign Deposit Money
Bank Consumer Loans
TF.BF.TUKKRE.L014:I.E
Housing Loans Deposit Money Bank Housing
Loansþ Participation Bank
Housing Loans
TP.BFTUKKRE.L005:I.C.1 þ
TP.BFTUKKRE.L235:III.A.1
Commercial Loans Public Deposit Money Bank
Commercial Instalment
Loansþ Private Deposit Money
Bank Commercial Instalment
Loansþ Foreign Deposit Money
Bank Commercial Instalment Loans
TF.BFTUKKRE.L039:I.H.1
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DCRt ¼ a0 þ qCRt1 þ hþCBFþt1 þ hCBFt1 þ
Xp1
j¼1
cjDCRtj þ
Xq1
j¼0
uþj DCBF
þ
tj þ uj DCBFtj
 
þ et:
(4)
DCRt ¼ a0 þ qft1 þ
Xp1
j¼1
cjDCRtj þ
Xq1
j¼0
uþj DCBF
þ
tj þ uj DCBFtj
 
þ et:
where ft ¼ CRtbþCBFþt bCBFt ; bþ ¼ hþ=q; and b ¼ h=q
(5)
This is the basic model that we will be estimating for the main inference of this
paper. The lag orders (p and q) are determined by following the general-to-specific
approach15 within the Stepwise Regression method internally, where the nonsignifi-
cant coefficients are dropped. To test for the existence of an asymmetric long-run
relationship (cointegration), we benefit from the model based on the N.A.R.D.L.-
E.C.M. approach described above.16
In this study, we employ the N.A.R.D.L.-E.C.M. methodology rather than a value
at risk (V.A.R.) methodology, the latter of which allows a feedback mechanism from
different types of lending to assess the effect of C.B.F. on these lending types. Using
impulse response functions gathered from V.A.R. for inferences requires the assump-
tion that shocks to C.B.F. capture monetary policy stance. After 2010, the C.B.R.T.
adopted multiple tools to conduct its monetary policy framework, as also stressed by
Turkey’s Financial Stability Board (2015). One should note that the European
Commission (2014, p. 39 and 2015, p. 30) criticises Turkish monetary policy for its
complexity and recommends that the C.B.R.T. solely focus on an inflation-targeting
regime. The International Monetary Fund (2014, p. 17) also stresses the hampering
effect of multiple tools on financial markets and claims that they disturb the inflation-
targeting process. Thus, there is no single variable that can be used as a monetary
policy tool. For this reason, we could not use V.A.R. to gather inferences. Further,
introducing an asymmetry to V.A.R. requires a set of arbitrary assumptions, which
may produce different types of impulse responses. Studying the effect of monetary
policy within a multiple-tool framework and considering various specifications that
introduce asymmetry within a V.A.R. framework are beyond the scope of this study.
4. Empirical results and discussion
Table 2 reports the estimated parameters of the N.A.R.D.L.-E.C.M. model and the set
of statistics across different lending categories when Required Reserves are excluded
from C.B.F. Both long-run coefficients for CBFþt1 and CBF
þ
t1 across all types of
lending are negative. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level for
both positive and negative C.B.F. coefficients for Total Bank Loans, Total Credit
Cards and Housing Loans. They are not statistically significant at the 5% level for the
other three lending types. Estimating these coefficients as negative is parallel to the
expectations of the error correction specification: an excessive increase (or decrease)
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in C.B.F. relative to credits that long-run equilibrium requires, decreases (or
increases) C.B.F. in the next period.
On the long-term relationship between C.B.F. and each lending type, we provide
various long-run (cointegration) test statistics. LþCBF and L

CBF are the test statistics for
the long-run coefficients associated with positive and negative changes in C.B.F.
These coefficients and their statistics suggest that we reject the null of no-cointegra-
tion only for Total Credit Cards for both positive and negative cointegrations, and
for Automobile Loans only for negative autocorrelation. Alternatively, if q ¼ 0, then
the equation suggests that there is no long-run relationship among CR, CBFþ and
CBF-. Second, following Banerjee et al. (1998), we test H0 : q ¼ 0 versus HA : q<0
[tBDM test]; we cannot reject the null of no-cointegration for any lending category
that we consider at the 5% level. Third, in order to test the long-term relationship, by
following Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), we test the null of H0 : q ¼ hþ ¼ h ¼ 0
[FPSS test]; we can reject the null of no-cointegration for Total Credit Cards and
Housing Loans at the 5% level. The results are also parallel with the long-run asym-
metry test, where the test statistics are reported by WLR (H0 : hþ=q ¼ h=q). We
can reject the long-run asymmetry at the 5% level only for Total Credit Cards and
Automotive Loans. Thus, overall we find limited support for an asymmetric cointe-
gration or for a long-run relationship between C.B.F. and each of the
credit categories.
One of the advantages of the A.R.D.L. or bounds-testing approach a la Pesaran,
Shin and Smith (2001) is that we can still use our basic modelling scheme for infer-
ences, regardless of whether the series are I(0) and I(1) or mutually cointegrated.
Next, we test the short-run asymmetry with H0 :
Pq1
j¼0 u
þ
j ¼
Pq1
j¼0 u

j and report
the statistics as WSR. We clearly reject the null of no-short-run asymmetry for all
credit groups at the 1% level. Thus, regardless of whether there is long-run symmetry,
we find statistically significant evidence for the presence of short-run asymmetry.
One of the aims of this paper is to analyse how increases and decreases in C.B.F.
affect Total Loans and its sub-components. In order to capture that effect, we calcu-
late the dynamic asymmetric (or nonlinear) multipliers (see Delatte and Lopez-
Villavicencio 2012; Shin et al., 2014 and Hoang et al., 2016 for the details of the
methodology). The multipliers are basically captured by:
mþh ¼
Xh
j¼0
@CRtþj
@CBFþt
andmh ¼
Xh
j¼0
@CRtþj
@CBFt
;where h ¼ 0; 1; 2; 3; ::: (6)
The multipliers given in Equation (6) converge to the long-run coefficients of
funding to credits, calculated by hþ=q and h=q.17
Figure 2 reports the dynamic multiplier of C.B.F. for Total Bank Loans and a set
of loan components for 26 periods. The solid black line reports the dynamic multi-
plier when there is an increase in C.B.F. The broken black line is for the effect of
lowering C.B.F. The grey lines represent the differences of the solid and broken black
lines. The middle grey line stands for the differences and the other two lines stand
for the confidence intervals of the differences. The bandwidths for the 90%
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confidence bands are calculated by the bootstrap method, with 40,000 replications. If
we cannot reject that the grey line is different from zero, then we can conclude that
there is no asymmetry for the corresponding period. Panel A in Figure 2 suggests
that as C.B.F. increases, Total Bank Loans decreases, and as C.B.F. decreases, Total
Bank Loans increases. However, the grey line suggests that an increase in C.B.F.
decreases Total Bank Loans, which is more than the increasing effect of C.B.F. for
Total Bank Loans for nine periods. This finding implies that an increase in C.B.F. is
more effective for Total Bank Loans than a decrease in C.B.F. initially. This effect is
statistically significant for six periods.
On the effect of C.B.F. on the sub-components of Total Bank Loans, Panel B
assesses C.B.F. effect on Total Credit Cards and Panel C assesses its effect on
Automobile Loans. Similar to Total Bank Loans, an increase in C.B.F. decreases these
two variables, and a decrease in C.B.F. increases these two variables. Moreover,
Figure 2. Central bank funding (C.B.F.) multipliers when required reserves are not excluded. Notes:
The solid black line reports the dynamic multiplier for an increase in F.N.; the dashed black line is
for a decrease in F.N.; the middle red line is for the difference in the absolute value of dynamic
multipliers; the other two red lines are for the confidence bands for the differences.
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similar to Total Bank Loans, initially, the effect of increasing C.B.F. is higher than the
effect of decreasing C.B.F. on these two variables. These effects are statistically signifi-
cant for the first seven periods for Total Credit Cards and for the first five periods
for Automobile Loans. However, after 12 periods, an increase in C.B.F. is more effect-
ive than a decrease in C.B.F. for Credit Cards. Panels D, E and F report the effect of
C.B.F. on Consumption Loans, Housing Loans and Commercial Loans. Initially, an
increase in C.B.F. decreases all three loans and a decrease in C.B.F. increases all three
loans. However, after three periods, we find an increase for Commercial Loans. In
determining whether increasing versus decreasing C.B.F. is more effective, we find
that for Consumption Loans and Housing Loans, decreasing C.B.F. is more effective
than increasing C.B.F. Regarding the first 13 periods for Consumption Loans,
between six and 12 periods of decreasing C.B.F. increases these two loans more than
increasing C.B.F. decreases them in a statistically significant fashion. It seems that an
increase in C.B.F. does not decrease Commercial Loans very much, but a decrease in
C.B.F. increases Commercial Loans after three periods. If we look at the long-run
effect, then an increase versus decrease in C.B.F. affects only two lending types differ-
ently: Total Credit Cards and Commercial Loans. Higher C.B.F. is more effective to
decrease Total Credit Cards than lower C.B.F. is. On the other hand, lower C.B.F. (a
looser monetary stance) is more effective to increase Commercial Loans than higher
C.B.F. is after the eighth month.
Overall, the evidence suggests that increasing C.B.F. decreases loans for all catego-
ries and decreasing C.B.F. increases loans for all categories. However, increasing
C.B.F. is more effective for changing loans for Total Bank Loans, Total Credit Cards
and Automobile Loans; decreasing C.B.F. is more effective for Consumption Loans
and Housing Loans. This finding is parallel to Lang and Nakamura (1995): banks
have more incentive to finance less-risky projects during monetary tightness. We
could not find a statistically significant effect for asymmetry on Commercial Loans.
When one looks at the magnitude of the changes, Figure 2 reveals that a one-unit
change (increase or decrease) in C.B.F., not surprisingly, changes Total Bank Loans
the most. When we look at the components, a one-unit decrease in C.B.F. increases
Consumption Loans and Credit Cards the most. However, a one-unit increase in
C.B.F. decreases Credit Cards the most. An increase in C.B.F. decreases Commercial
Loans and Automobile Loans the least. One may interpret these findings as follows: if
a central bank adopts a tighter monetary policy through C.B.F., this will be more
effective for Total Bank Loans, mostly due to consumer (rather than corporate) cred-
its. Note that if one considers that Credit Cards and Consumption Loans serve simi-
lar purposes, then loans on Credit Cards are riskier than on Consumption Loans and
have a shorter maturity. Similarly, for C.B.s, Automobile Loans and Housing Loans
may have similar risk exposures; the interest rates banks charge on Automobile Loans
are higher than interest on Housing Loans, and the former usually have a shorter
maturity. The evidence suggests that with tighter monetary policy, C.B.s cut credit
lines on riskier loans and give them shorter maturities. On the other hand, C.B.s
extend credit lines on loans with lower risk exposure and longer maturities. These
findings support the proposition that C.B.s decrease their risk exposure the most with
tight monetary propositions (Lang and Nakamura, 1995).
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5. Robustness analyses
Within the previous analyses reported in Table 2 and Figure 2, we use C.B.F. where
the Required Reserves are excluded (one may call it net C.B.F.). This approach
requires that reserves be exogenous18 and might not change with commercial bank
liquidity risk. Note that in August 2011, the C.B.R.T. introduced the R.O.M. to
decrease the adverse effects of capital flows on economic performance (see Sahin,
Dogan and Berument, 2015). This mechanism allows C.B.s to keep part of their
domestic-currency-denominated required reserve obligations in foreign currency.
Thus, due to the R.O.M., Required Reserves might be responding to deposits as well
as C.B.s’ foreign-currency-denominated obligations. Therefore, we repeat the exercise
without subtracting Required Reserves from C.B.F. The relevant estimates are
reported in Table 3 and the relevant dynamic multipliers are reported in Figure 3.
Table 3 reveals a relatively lower level of support both for positive and negative coin-
tegration and thus long-run asymmetry, but the results for the short-run relationship
and its asymmetry are robust. Figure 3 reveals the same pattern for the dynamic mul-
tipliers even though the patterns for the differences are shorter for Consumer Loans,
and the differences in the increasing and decreasing effects of C.B.F. on Housing
Loans are higher.19 Thus, we claim that our results are robust to different ways of
measuring C.B.F.
6. Conclusions and further research
In this paper, we analyse the dynamic asymmetric effects of C.B.F. changes on com-
mercial bank lending practices. A resilient banking sector depends on efficient usage
of external resources (see, for example, Basel, 2017; Dovern, Meier and Vilsmeier,
2010 and Briguglio, Cordina, Farrugia and Vella, 2009). To this end, central banks
develop tools additional to their conventional tools (such as short-term interest rates)
to conduct their policies. The present study provides empirical evidence from Turkey
on the effectiveness of one of these tools: Central Bank Funding. Our evidence indi-
cates that if the C.B.R.T. increases the cost of borrowing for short-term loans for
commercial banks and thus decreases all types of lending, a lower cost of funding is
associated with higher lending. When we examine the asymmetric effects of C.B.F. on
lending choices, then:
i. There is no sign asymmetry in terms of commercial lending.
ii. However, with tight monetary policy, C.B.s choose lending that has higher risk
exposure and lower maturity for consumers. On the other hand, with a loose
monetary policy, C.B.s extend their credit lines on the types of lending that have
lower risk exposure and longer maturities for consumers.
iii. Therefore, we may claim that there is magnitude (an increase versus decrease in
C.B.F.) and category asymmetry (across different lending categories).
This study can be extended in various directions as C.B.F. also affects the liability
side of commercial banks’ balance sheets. First, a further study could analyse how
deposits and their compositions are affected by C.B.F. changes. Second, as
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commercial banks in developing countries tend to use their ability to borrow abroad
to extend domestic credits, a study on how C.B.F. affects this borrowing mechanism
through different channels, such as bond and swap markets, would be interesting.
Third, as commercial banks have a high level of foreign exchange positions in their
balance sheets, and may meet funding needs through these foreign exchange opera-
tions, the effect of C.B.F. on the foreign exchange market could be considered. And
finally, one could conduct research on the effect of C.B.F. on small- and medium-
sized businesses’ liability dollarisation.
Notes
1. While these tools have been actively been used since the 2008 financial crises, the
C.B.R.T. has been using multiple tools to conduct monetary policy (such as using
overnight interest rates along with exchange rate) since 1986, though not independently
(see Berument, 2007).
Figure 3. Central bank funding multipliers when required reserves are not excluded. Notes:
The solid black line reports the dynamic multiplier for an increase in FN; the dashed black line is
for a decrease in FN; the middle red line is for the difference in the absolute value of dynamic
multipliers; the other two red lines are for the confidence bands for the differences.
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2. For example, the C.B.R.T. decreased its policy rate from 6.50 to 6.25 on 20 January 2011,
and increased required reserve ratios on 24 January 2011.
3. Hakan Kara is the chief economist for the C.B.R.T.
4. Loan maturity may also affect C.B.F. effectiveness, as consumption loans generally have
lower maturities than commercial loans do. Kara (2015b, p. 8) supports this proposition
by suggesting that an increase in the average maturity of personal loans restricts
monetary policy effectiveness; thus the C.B.R.T. may wish to restrict maturities on
consumption loans.
5. We replicate Guler et al. (2014) by considering different types of banking sector credits
that use a Vector Autoregressive (V.A.R.) framework with N.A.R.D.L.-E.C.M. We also
perform the estimates with V.A.R., which are available upon request. The paper
contributes to the V.A.R. versus A.R.D.L. debate in the empirical sense.
6. Erdem Basçı is a former governor of the C.B.R.T.; his tenure ended on 19 April 2016.
7. Central banks may also target credit growth rates, which are sensitive to interest rates, as
argued by Fase (1995), and the C.B.R.T. does have a credit growth target rate of 15%
(Varlik and Berument, 2016).
8. Further, the share of commercial and individual loans within C.B.s’ Turkish Lira (T.L.)-
denominated credit volume is 92% (source: C.B.R.T., Electronic Data Delivery System
(E.D.D.S.). Seventy percent of Turkey’s banks are C.B.s, 96% of the total banking sector’s
assets consist of C.B.s and 95% of the sector’s net profit belongs to C.B.s (source: Turkish
Banking Association Statistical Database). Thus, the C.B.R.T. adopted a set of policies to
affect this transmission mechanism (see, for example, Varlik and Berument, 2016).
9. For a more complete discussion of monetary policy developments, see also Varlik and
Berument (2017).
10. The C.B.R.T. conducts O.M.O.s through eight channels, as provided in Chapter III,
Article 52 of the Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (Law No. 1211):
liquidity bill issues, repo transactions through quotations, outright sales through auctions,
outright purchases through auctions, repo auctions, outright purchases through
quotations, reverse repo auctions and reverse repo transactions through quotations. The
CBF is the sum of the repo and depo transactions, thus it is calculated by deducting the
total sterilisation from the CBRT’s total funding items. (Total funding is the sum of
funding through auctions and funding through quotations, and total sterilisation is the
sum of sterilisation through auctions and sterilisation through quotations.) These
definitions and explanations are provided mostly based on information from the
C.B.R.T.’s E.D.D.S. website: http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/index_en.html.
11. One could look directly at the cost effects of C.B.R.T. lending on commercial bank
lending. However, determining these effects is not an easy task. Note that the C.B.R.T.
adopts a very complex structure for the liquidity it provides. For example, the overnight
rate is not the same for all banks; market makers can get liquidity at a lower rate and the
R.O.M. allows commercial banks to meet their required reserve obligations for T.L.-
denominated deposits with foreign currency at a lower nominal interest rate (see Sahin
et al., 2015).
12. Since interest rates in European countries and the United States are much lower
compared with Turkey now and for the period we study, banks and big firms may
choose to borrow in foreign currency (see Sahin and Sahin, 2014). The CBRT attempts
to sterilise excess liquidity by automatic stabiliser tools such as the R.O.M.; however, in
terms of T.L. borrowing, the C.B.R.T. is the lender of last resort in the financial market.
Although foreign lending is dominant as a source of credit in terms of foreign currency,
C.B.F. affects the credit allocation in the banking sector. That effect is beneficial in
Stiglitz’s (2015) sense, which claims that monetary policy affects credit availability
through the banking sector.
13. Commercial banks must meet their obligations to the central bank within a two-week
window; moreover, in order to guarantee the exogeneity of the denominator, we had to
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deflate the variables with a month’s worth of delay. Thus, the lag delay of the
denominator was six.
14. One can claim that there is an omitted-variable bias because of not taking other control
variables such as the central bank’s open market operations into consideration while
explaining the behaviour of banking sector lending. Papers such as Alper, Binici,
Demiralp, Kara and Ozlu (2014) also include variables such as confidence index.
However, our aim is to investigate the asymmetric behaviour in the dynamic
specification and C.B.F. explains the credit growth sufficiently in econometric terms
without an omitted variable bias.
15. In order to implement the general-to-specific approach, we set the lag order as 12 first,
then drop the insignificant coefficients (starting from the least significant) until all
included variables have individually statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level.
16. There are other types of E.C.M. in the literature. For instance, Sweiden (2011) benefits
from asymmetric E.C.M. and explores a symmetric effect of policy rate on lending rate in
the banking sector.
17. Here, the immediate effect of a one-unit increase in C.B.F. on CR is considered for h
periods. If there is a case of low-level persistency, then it is assumed that the impact
starts to diminish for longer horizons (see Verbeek, 2004, pp. 310–312).
18. One can assume that C.B.F. is an endogenous variable as in the V.A.R. analysis that we
mentioned in the previous notes. However, in our specification and assumptions, C.B.F.
that is keenly monitored by the C.B.R.T. is assumed to behave exogenously to the
banking system.
19. Our specification in Equation (4) allows both long-run and short-run asymmetries. We
also estimate a new set of multipliers under the restrictions with (i) no long-run
asymmetry (hþ ¼ h) , (ii) no short-run asymmetry (uþj ¼ uj for all j) and (iii) neither
long-run nor short-run asymmetries (hþ ¼ h and uþj ¼ uj for all j). Most of these
dynamic multipliers are counter-intuitive. We did not include these figures to save space
but they are available upon request.
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